Les rendez-vous constitutionnels

franco-britanniques

 

“Des chambres hautement menacées..?”

Reform of the House of Lords

and the model of the French Senate

 

Tuesday 7 December 1999

The British Council France

 

 

 

A public debate chaired by     

 

Meg Russell                              Didier Maus

Senior Research Fellow,            President, Association

The Constitution Unit               Française des Constitutionnalistes

 

With the participation of         

 

Lord Ivor Richard                     Patrice Gélard    

Former Leader of the                 Sénateur (RPR)

House of Lords                          Seine-Maritime    

 

In December 1999 the UK stood on the threshold of a modern revolution. After more than a century of debate and over 700 years of participation, hereditary peers had been expelled from the House of Lords and the form and structure of government in the UK had reached a significant turning-point. Weeks before the publication of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Lords Reform, Des chambres hautement menacées…?, the second debate in the British Council’s series of Rendez-vous Constitutionnels offered a unique opportunity to share opinions and experiences of other systems and preferences of modern governance.

 

Les Rendez-vous Constitutionnels were conceived by the British Council France as a response to each major step in the British government’s programme of constitutional reform and have been designed to provide an informal framework in which to encourage reciprocal exchange and dialogue between policy actors, commentators and public on the evolution of our respective civil structures.

We were delighted to welcome Lord Ivor Richard QC, a Life Peer and former Leader of the House of Lords alongside Sénateur Patrice Gélard and an invited audience of policy actors and commentators to juxtapose the parallels of the functions and future form of the House of Lords and French Senate as part of Des chambres hautement menacées…? Under the expert Chairmanship and European experience of Meg Russell and Didier Maus, the debate not only considered the future of second chambers, but also turned attention towards how the new and increasing number of competing constitutional jigsaws might fit together on a national, European or international scale.

 

In the spirit of Les Rendez-vous Constitutionnels, this account has been prepared to provide a flavour of the constitutional reform programme in the UK. As part of this report, we have also chosen to include a complete list of questions raised by the debate as well as those which were answered by the panel. We hope this will encourage yet further enthusiasm for the diversity of issues common to all systems of modern governance and an even greater appetite for European contemplation of our constitutional futures.

 

 

Sir Michael Jay

Je suis ravi que nous ayons réuni ce soir de grands orateurs aussi prestigieux et une assistance de pareille qualité.  Je félicite le British Council d’avoir organisé ce débat, le second dans la série des rendez-vous constitutionnels.

 

La réforme des institutions est aujourd’hui partout à l’ordre du jour.  Au sein de l’Union Européenne elle sera examinée par le conseil européen ce week-end à Helsinki.  Au sein de l’OMC la nécessité d’une réforme du mode de fonctionnement devient criant au lendemain de l’échec des négociations de Seattle. En France aussi, l’on remet en cause, entre autres questions, le cumul des mandats ou la réforme de la justice.  C’est partout, tout à fait d’actualité. 

 

On sait le grand chantier sur le front des institutions qu’a engagé Tony Blair et son gouvernement du New Labour depuis deux ans et demi.  L’Ecosse et le Pays de Galles se sont prononcés par les référendums pour une certaine autonomie.  Le parlement écossais et l’assemblée galloise ont été instauré en mai dernier par les élections au suffrage universel direct.  La semaine dernière, ce fut le tour de l’Irlande du Nord de se doter d’une administration autonome dans le cadre des nouveaux dispositifs institutionnels mis en place avec l’aval du gouvernement britannique et du gouvernement irlandais, et déterminé par référendum pour le vote de la République d’Irlande et la province de l’Irlande du Nord.  David Trimble, le « First Minister » de l’Irlande du Nord, se verra remettre demain, à Paris, la légion d’honneur des mains du ministre des Affaires européennes, Pierre Moscovici. Les élections du parlement européen de juin dernier ont eu lieu pour la première fois en Grande-Bretagne au scrutin proportionnel et l’introduction de la proportionnelle est également un fait marquant aux élections du Parlement écossais et de l’assemblée galloise. Le 4 mai 2000, Londres élira son maire et son assemblée municipale au suffrage direct pour la première fois.  D’autres grandes villes, comme Liverpool, semblent vouloir lui emboîter le pas.

 

Le mois dernier le gouvernement a annoncé quatre nouveaux projets de loi de réforme des institutions : la liberté d’accès aux documents administratifs, la réforme des collectivités locales, le financement des partis politiques et la réforme du code électoral.  Le projet de loi sur l’accès des documents administratifs,  «the Freedom of Information Act»  est venu en dernière lecture au parlement britannique aujourd’hui.  Dans ce catalogue déjà fourni, bien évidemment, s’est rajoutée la réforme de la chambre des Lords qui est l’objet du débat de ce soir.  Gladstone, Lloyd George, Harold Wilson, tous s’y sont essayé, tous s’y sont cassé les dents.  La voilà aujourd’hui en œuvre.  Fonctionnera-t-elle ?  Aura-t-elle des enseignements à tirer du Sénat français ?  Quel est l’objet des chambres hautes ?  Quel doit être le mode de désignation des représentants qui y siègent ?  Ce sont là autant de questions qui j’en suis sûr seront âprement discutées ce soir.  D’avance je me fais un plaisir d’assister à ce débat.

 

Meg Russell

It is a pleasure to be here this evening, participating in this important debate. As you may know the Constitution Unit is an independent think-tank producing practical research for policy makers.  During the course of our recent work on the reform of the House of Lords, we have noticed that the majority of debates on the reform process have focussed, rather predictably on  British  history and British  traditions rather broader European or international contexts. With this in mind, we decided to undertake a comparative study at the Constitution Unit which would look at second chambers around the world to see what could be learnt from the process of Lords reform.  I’ve been leading this study for the past year and will publish its results next week in my book Reforming the Lords, which looks at the experience of second chambers in seven countries including France.

 

I think it is important that we begin tonight’s debate by briefly detailing a few of the less subtle similarities and differences between the situations in the UK and France. 

My first and perhaps most obvious observation relates to the House of Lords and the French Senate as descendants of traditional hereditary chambers, albeit that links were broken with the chambre des pairs  rather longer ago in France than in the UK, both chambers were originally set up as conservative institutions and continue to wield conservative influences within their respective government systems. Indeed, the House of Lords and the Sénat have been dominated by right-wing politics which have obstructed the political left of both countries  for over a century. Now that reform minded, centre-left governments are in place in France and the UK, similar levels of interest are being demonstrated in both countries for a change in the role and structure of their respective upper houses. The continued prevalence of conservative attitudes and influences, even after significant changes to political balances of second chambers, has indicated that both countries face considerable difficulties in addressing or successfully implementing a popular process of reform.

 

Even after the implementation of reforms set out in the House of Lords Act, the most striking difference between the second chambers remains the fact that the interim House of Lords still includes 92 hereditary peers and reserves 26 seats purely for the Bishops and Archbishops of the Anglican Church. As the House of Lords is also the UK’s highest Court of Appeal senior members of the judiciary including 12 active Law Lords and 15 former Law Lords also sit as active members of the British second chamber.

While these are salient areas of contrast, in the context of this evening’s debate, perhaps the most striking area of difference between France and the UK are the powers accorded to each chamber.

Many of you may have been surprised by the speed of reform in the UK, and the way in which, despite 100 years of debate on the removal of hereditary peers, the Labour government under Tony Blair has successfully managed to implement significant change with very little resistance.  Despite periods of Socialist, reform-minded government, the same is not true of France where the upper house remains very much as it was in 1958.  The key explanation for this and other differences in the developments of our respective upper houses, is the constitution.

 

As the UK does not have a written constitution, the upper house has no special protective power over the constitution. Consequently, the House of Lords is not able to stand in the way of attempts to reform the constitution any more than it is able to block the passage of ordinary legislation where at the most extreme, bills can only be delayed for a maximum of one year. The UK has embarked upon the current programme of constitutional change with the objective of making the process of government in the UK more democratic and accountable. In light of this, I would suggest that in order to protect the new, emerging constitutional structures thought should be given to bringing the new second chamber closer to the model of the French Senate when we are re-defining the role and structure of the British upper house.

 

Didier Maus

Je voudrais d’abord remarquer dans mon introduction, combien l’étendue du programme de réforme constitutionnelle,  mis en œuvre depuis deux ans et demi par le gouvernement britannique, a de quoi étonner quelques constitutionnalistes français.  Je crois qu’il y a de la part des français un très grand intérêt et une très grande interrogation sur l’ensemble de ce programme de reforme constitutionnelle au Royaume-Uni. 

 

Meg Russell vient de dire que la réforme de la chambre des Lords avait été menée à bien sans beaucoup de résistance ou beaucoup d’opposition, et que cela tenait pour une part à l’absence de constitution écrite. Ceci est évidemment une très grande différence entre le Royaume-Uni et la France, ainsi qu’entre le Royaume-Uni et l’ensemble de ses 13 autres pays voisins de l’Union Européenne. 

La situation britannique est particulière.  Si dans certaines négociations internationales récentes, la France a tendance à parler de l’exception culturelle française, je crois que nous pouvons, d’un point de vue comparatif, parler ainsi de l’exception constitutionnelle britannique.  Nous remarquons que  l’exception a souvent beaucoup d’avantages et c’est peut-être autour de la souplesse avec laquelle les Britanniques font évoluer leur système et leur architecture institutionnelle, que nous avons à réfléchir et à apprendre.  Le Royaume-Uni a passé en revue beaucoup de thèmes et aujourd’hui on  parle de la Chambre des Lords.

 

La première interrogation des Français sur ce sujet est certainement « pourquoi ? » Quelles étaient les raisons, peut-être autres que symboliques (les symboles ayant bien une importance en politique) qui ont mené aussi vite à la suppression des pairs héréditaires au Royaume-Uni ?

Nous avons expliqué que les Lords ne siégeaient pas uniquement quand ils siégeaient dans le hall et qu’ils formaient une assemblée d’opposition.  Les pairs héréditaires comme les pairs à vie, n’avaient qu’un pouvoir de retardement et pas véritablement un pouvoir de blocage sur les textes législatifs.  Ces constats mènent à un certain nombre d’autres questions. Le premier élément de considération comparatif, et à mon avis typiquement britannique et totalement différent de ce qui se passe en France, est le processus.  Les Britanniques ont supprimé les pairs héréditaires sans savoir par quoi ils seront remplacés.  Il y a une commission royale qui réfléchit actuellement à comment recomposer une Chambre des Lords, puisque ce n’est plus recomposer pour l’histoire.  Faut-il que cette nouvelle chambre soit composée des célébrités du moment  ou par les personnes qui à un certain âge sont considérées comme étant la conscience du Royaume ?  Sans doute ces interrogations peuvent nous ramener en France à quelques propos du type saint-simonien, ils soulèvent une grande question en France car personne ne proposerait de supprimer quelque chose sans prévoir immédiatement le remplacement.  Où le vide nous fait horreur en France, en Grande-Bretagne il est accepté. 

 

La deuxième piste de réflexion française est sans doute centrée sur la question « Par quoi va-t-on remplacer la Chambre des Lords ? »  Là, nous retombons sur la problématique classique des deuxièmes chambres dans le monde entier dont nous aurons l’occasion de reparler à travers ce débat.  Pour ma part, je suis très frappé par toutes les questions qui sont de l’ordre de cette question-là. Les enjeux sont exactement les mêmes que celles que l’on pose ailleurs, où on se demande à quoi sert une chambre haute, comment la composer, etc. 

 

Enfin, le troisième et dernier sujet d’étonnement en France est la variété des rôles de la Chambre des Lords.  Meg Russell nous a rappelé qu’il y a 26 archevêques qui siègent à la Chambre des Lords.  En France, car il y a une séparation de l’Eglise avec l’Etat, nous avons quelquefois un ecclésiastique, mais certainement pas en fonction d’ecclésiastique, mais à ma connaissance il n’y en a pas en ce moment. Les derniers furent le chanoine  Kir et l’abbé Audrain, qui avaient été élus.

Nous constatons également  le rôle judiciaire de la Chambre des Lords qui est extraordinaire. En France nous avons redécouvert cette fonction de la deuxième chambre britannique à la télévision à travers le rôle des Law Lords dans l’affaire Pinochet,  et quel ne fut pas notre étonnement.  Je crois qu’il y a plusieurs membres de la magistrature parmi nous ce soir, qui peuvent parler de leur sentiment  quand ils voient successivement ces cinq Lords se lever devant leurs collègues en civil, et dire My Lords, voilà mon opinion.  Dans le jugement Pinochet,  il y avait deux Lords pour, deux Lords contre, et un cinquième qui finalement s’est levé pour exprimer qu’il partageait l’opinion de son collègue distingué, qui a fait la décision.  Pour l’observateur français c’est extraordinaire.  D’abord par le raisonnement, ensuite par la procédure et enfin par l’individualisation de l’opinion, qui vont au-delà de l’opinion individuelle et que l’on souhaite sur quelques points de s’introduire au Conseil Constitutionnel.  En tout cela ce n’est plus que l’opinion de la décision individuelle mais la décision collective qui n’est que la somme des décisions individuelles.  Nous reviendrons certainement sur ces  questions au travers de notre débat ce soir pour apprendre ainsi sur un de nos voisins les plus proches mais qui demeure à beaucoup d’égards mystérieux, notamment sur tous les points constitutionnels.

 

Patrice Gélard

Je dirai que pour moi il n’y a pas de démocratie sans seconde chambre.  L’histoire constitutionnelle française a démontré que les périodes révolutionnaires, les périodes où les libertés étaient mises en cause, étaient des périodes monocamérales.  A chaque fois que nous avons eu la démocratie c’était parce que nous avions deux chambres. 

 

La deuxième remarque que je ferai c’est qu’en France nous avons essayé toutes les sortes de secondes chambres :  l’âge, avec le conseil des anciens du premier directoire, les grands bois de la nation avec le premier et le second empire, les témoins du temps (que l’on pourrait dire un peu décatis mais tout de même les témoins du temps), le système des Lords héréditaires, et le système non-héréditaire avec la monarchie et la monarchie de juillet, et puis la représentativité des collectivités territoriales avec la Troisième, Quatrième et Cinquième République.  On a donc tout essayé, et c’est le système de la représentativité des collectivités territoriales qui a duré le plus longtemps.  Heureusement on a un statut protégé, doublement protégé. 

 

D’abord la deuxième chambre française est protégée par la constitution.  En effet, l’article 24 de la constitution comprend deux principes. D’abord que le Sénat est élu au suffrage indirect, et le deuxième principe, que nous assurons la représentation des collectivités territoriales de la république.  Par conséquent si on veut modifier ces deux principes qui gouvernent le Sénat actuel, on serait obligé de réviser la constitution avec l’accord et l’appui du Sénat existant,  ce qui n’est pas évident.

La deuxième protection est garantie par la loi organique qui ne peut être modifiée qu’avec l’accord du Sénat, et là nous avons un certain nombre de protections.  Ceci comprend la durée des pouvoirs du Sénat, le nombre de membres, actuellement 321, et le montant de l’indemnité, où actuellement on ne fait pas pire !  Les Sénateurs travaillent comme les députés en ce qui concerne les conditions d’éligibilité, d’inéligibilité, d’incompatibilité et de remplacement. Pourtant, ces conditions sont le sujet de la réforme en cours de la loi organique. C’est à ce point où la loi risque d’échapper car il y a la loi ordinaire pour ce qui concerne le mode de scrutin applicable à l’élection des sénateurs qui nous toucheront directement au Sénat dans le sens où nous n’avons pas de droit de veto dans ce domaine et l’Assemblée nationale décidera.

 

Alors quels sont les arguments en faveur du mode de scrutin ?  D’abord on dit que le Sénat est toujours à droite mais il ne faut pas oublier que le Sénat au début de la Cinquième République, de 1958 à 1969, était résolument dans l’opposition à la Présidence de la République et s’opposait à ce que faisait le Président.  C’était là où tous les leaders de gauche s’étaient retrouvés, y compris le Président François Mitterrand qui y était pendant ce moment-là sénateur. Il y avait également une période où le Sénat était à gauche et au centre-gauche. Par conséquent je dirais qu’ il  n’est pas vrai de dire que le Sénat a toujours été à droite.

 

La deuxième remarque que je voudrais faire sur ce point concerne les villes qui sont sous-représentées par rapport à la population urbaine. Il faut faire attention à ce phénomène car au Sénat nous ne représentons pas la population mais les collectivités territoriales.  D’ailleurs il est peut-être gênant que nous ne représentions pas les régions (une nouvelle collectivité territoriale) et que nous représentions beaucoup plus les départements et  pas assez les grandes villes, mais nous ne sommes pas là pour être la copie conforme de l’Assemblée nationale.  Si nous devions le devenir, il n’y aurait plus aucun intérêt à maintenir les différences entre les deux chambres.

Qu’est-ce qui nous attend ?  A l’heure actuelle le gouvernement a trois lois qui concernent directement ou indirectement le statut du sénateur.  La première loi est la loi électorale portant réforme à la désignation des Sénateurs. Essentiellement cette loi désigne deux dispositions. La première d’étendre le scrutin proportionnel au département à trois sénateurs et plus et la deuxième consiste à augmenter le nombre des grands électeurs dans les villes. La première disposition ne changera pas grand chose car actuellement, à une exception près, il y a plus que cinq Sénateurs par département. Une limite imposant trois Sénateurs par département ne fera pas beaucoup de différence à la composition du Sénat à l’heure actuelle, avec l’exception qu’un scrutin proportionnel permettra de mieux représenter certains départements. La deuxième réforme, par contre, peut avoir des conséquences.  Cette disposition consiste à élever le nombre de grands électeurs à 1 sénateur pour 500 habitants au lieu de 1 sénateur pour 1000 habitants. Les conséquences de cette réforme peuvent être évidentes en particulier dans les départements fortement urbanisés qui n’ont pas un nombre de communes très important où il peut y avoir des changements relativement importants.  On a tenté de les mesurer d’après les simulations et les derniers résultats des élections où on s’est aperçu que la droite perdrait entre 20 et 35 sièges avec l’ensemble de ces dispositions ce qui ne lui fera pas perdre la majorité qui est la sienne à l’heure actuelle.

 

Or il y a deux autres réformes qu’il faut constater,  l’effet de la loi sur la parité et la loi sur les cumuls des mandats.

La première réforme de l’obligation de la parité homme-femme dans les circonscriptions de scrutin proportionnel va poser beaucoup de problèmes dans certains départements, y compris ceux qui sont tenus par la gauche.  Prenons l’exemple de Paris où il y a douze sénateurs et une seule femme sénateur, cela veut dire que sur les 11 sénateurs hommes sortant, il y en aura quatre ou cinq qui devront disparaître. Par conséquent il y aura des drames, y compris dans les départements au scrutin majoritaire où il y a deux sénateurs car les militants vont vraisemblablement exiger la parité.  Quand on aura deux sénateurs hommes du même parti, il y en aura un qui devra se dégager parce qu’il va falloir mettre une femme, ce qui est  une véritable révolution des mentalités.  Je dirais qu’heureusement on n’est pas encore au système «chabababada», c’est-à-dire un homme-une femme-un homme-une femme, mais j’anticipe que  dans beaucoup de départements nous aurons encore comme têtes de liste les hommes et en fin de liste les femmes. Il faut remarquer que puisque le candidat sénateur est généralement un notable, ce problème sera plus difficile dans certains départements par rapport aux autres où il y a déjà un sénateur sortant, car il sera très difficile dans ces endroits de trouver les femmes en nombre suffisant. Dans tous les cas, il y aura certainement une grande bataille oratoire au mois de février au Sénat quand on discutera de cette loi. 

 

La deuxième loi qui nous concerne est la loi sur les cumuls des mandats, qui est maintenant en commission ministérielle paritaire. A l’heure actuelle, la règle exige que les Sénateurs puissent avoir trois mandats :  un mandat de Conseiller régional, de Conseiller général et un mandat parlementaire. Le mandat de Conseiller municipal ne comptant pas mais nous pouvons également cumuler les fonctions de Maire, Président du Conseil régional et Président du Conseil général avec ces mandats.

La nouvelle loi prévoit la loi ordinaire au niveau local et elle exige qu’on ne puisse avoir que deux mandats et qu’une fonction : Maire (fonction et mandat)  et Conseiller régional (mandat) ou Conseiller régional (mandat) et Président du Conseil général (mandat et fonction). Le Sénat a accepté cette règle au niveau des élections locales et la commission mixte paritaire devrait aboutir à s’entendre sur cette question.  Cependant cette disposition présente un problème sur la loi organique déposée par le gouvernement, car la loi organique  prévoit qu’on ne peut avoir que deux mandats et aucune fonction.  Selon cette disposition un sénateur ou un député ne peut plus être Maire, Président du Conseil général ou Président du Conseil régional. 

 

Notre conception du Sénat est qu’il ne faut pas aller trop vite.  Il y a des attitudes qui disent qu’il faut que les Sénateurs, qui sont les représentants des collectivités territoriales, gardent leurs contacts avec ces collectivités territoriales. Par conséquent nous proposons deux mandats et la possibilité de conserver une fonction. C’est à dire un mandat au niveau local et l’autre au niveau national, et  une fonction, soit de Maire, Président du Conseil général ou Président du Conseil régional. 

Mais là nous sommes dans le domaine de la loi organique, c’est-à-dire que le gouvernement ne peut passer outre à l’opposition du sénat, et l’on risque d’avoir un paradoxe si la loi organique n’est pas modifiée et que l’on continue de pouvoir être, en tant que sénateur, plus qu’on était auparavant et que d’autre part, qu’on ne puisse plus avoir, au niveau local, que deux mandats.  Même si je ne sais pas comment ces choses vont évoluer, le Sénat ne me semble pas hostile à la réforme.

 

Pour conclure j’aimerais remarquer qu’heureusement nous avons le Sénat en France. Imaginez un peu ce que seraient les lois françaises si le Sénat n’était pas là pour les corriger.  Les lois arrivent dans un tel état, tellement bâclées au niveau de l’Assemblée nationale, que même si l’assemblée nationale ne suit pas les modifications politiques que nous apportons, elle est tout de même tenue de respecter la forme et les règles du droit que nous mettons en place dans les amendements que l’on dépose et qui n’ont pas de portée politique.

 

J’ajouterai, hélas, heureusement que le Sénat est là, et je pense que ce sentiment aurait été soutenu par l’ancienne Chambre des Lords car nous pouvons prendre de temps dans ces propositions de loi quand le gouvernement et l’Assemblée nationale n’ont pas le temps de le faire.

 

Lord Ivor Richard

Listening to Senator Gélard, I have concluded that there is very little in common between the House of Lords and the French Senate. As Meg Russell has already said, we obviously have two very different constitutional systems and I would agree with Didier Maus, that the French are indeed most fortunate in having a written constitution. Nevertheless the difficulty is that even when there is total agreement that change is for the best, written constitutions are often so very difficult to change. I’m happy to say that this is not the experience in the UK as the non-written constitution offers a flexibility that has proved very useful to the course of  British politics thus far in our history.

 

Prior to our most recent reforms 1200 individuals were entitled to play an active, legislating role in the House of Lords. This is a number of individuals which appeared excessive for any effective modern legislature, especially given that the UK constitution sets out identical legislative functions for the upper and lower chambers of Parliament.  Similarly, it seemed absurd that two-thirds of these legislators, roughly 800 members of the House of Lords had no other qualification to legislate other than having been born male and surviving the death of their fathers. Over the centuries, this form of selection has produced very clear political consequences. On average, the House of Lords defeated Conservative government amendments to legislation between 10-12 times a year, compared to 17-18 times a year for amendments proposed by Labour governments. When we then approach the reform question from a left-wing perspective, this record points towards a significant, built-in political irrationality.

When considered together, these three elements (the size of the chamber, the impossibility of justifying the hereditary principle and the inequality of the resulting political consequences) represent the principle arguments fuelling the reform process. At the outset of discussions, it was decided to agree upon reform recommendations that would reflect and react to these key issues.  Our recommendations advised firstly that the hereditary basis of appointment was unjustifiable in the 21st century. Secondly, that the UK needed to retain a bi-cameral legislature and thirdly, that the power and status of the independent, “cross-benchers” should be preserved in the reformed upper house. While I see little reason in explaining why hereditary appointment is unjustifiable, I think it is worthwhile to briefly explain a little more of the logic behind the latter two recommendations. A second chamber is invaluable in the UK, principally because of the mass of legislation passing through parliament, where it becomes invaluable to ensure fresh interpretations and new approaches to legislative propositions.

Until recently the “cross-benchers” represented nearly 300 peers without allegiance to a political party who were situated within an overall composition of roughly 500 Conservative, 150 Labour, and 70 Liberal peers in the upper house. Given this strong political presence, the cross-benchers represented a source of independent thought and diversity of experience which was capable of adding significant value to the legislative process.

 

The key feature linking the different attempts to reform the House of Lords this century, is the fact that they have all uniformly failed.

Lords reform was first attempted in 1911 when it succeeded partly, but not permanently. It was re-addressed in 1948 but failed and attempted in 1968 only to fail again. In my opinion the main explanation behind these successive failures was that reformers aimed to change everything at once, reforming the composition and powers with, as we say in English, “just one bite at the cherry.”

Having learnt the lessons of the past the present government decided the most sensible strategy was to adopt an incremental approach to reform which dealt with the hereditary question first before conducting a major public consultation exercise through a Royal Commission.  As I don’t know if there is an equivalent in France, I should explain that Royal Commissions are bodies of distinguished, and ‘not-so’ distinguished individuals, presided over by someone ‘very distinguished indeed’. A Royal Commission has the power to listen to the evidence of all individuals groups and associations expressing interests on an issue. They then consider all the points of view expressed, alongside the issues presented and make non-binding recommendations to Parliament.

We are currently at the stage of reform where the problem of the hereditary peers has been tackled and the Royal Commission has consulted and considered the evidence.  In the coming weeks, the Royal Commission will publish their recommendations which will be then considered again by the political parties and pressure groups. From this process we hope to construct concrete proposals for a final model of reform. The basic decisions, currently being prepared by the Royal Commission are not straightforward as they deal with a number of questions on which it is difficult, if not impossible to produce unanimous agreement. An elected or partly elected second chamber? Two-thirds elected and one-third nominated, with or without party ties? Could the reformed upper house be a wholly non-elected chamber? What are the advantages of a wholly elected or a wholly nominated second chamber?  If members were elected what would be the basis of elections ?  Direct or  indirect ? If by proportional representation what should be the electoral unit?

These questions are not easy and require time and the widest possible consultation of interests to be sensibly and constructively answered.  Indeed, once answered, they only raise further questions. For example, in a reformed house what should be done about the Bishops since despite having no jurisdiction on religious matters the House of Lords allows 26 bishops to sit as members.

As things currently stand, I know one bishop who attends the House of Lords on a daily basis to pray for the “good health” of the Lords. Others, but not all, call in on the upper house from time to time to take part in debates. While there might be a very good argument for the participation of these members in the House of Lords, they are far from representative of the cross section of religious and spiritual beliefs in modern Britain and therefore, this seems to be just one example of where sensible justification for or against the status quo, will prove very difficult to reach.

 

QUESTIONS FROM THE FLOOR

 

What sort of  Assembly will eventually replace the House of Lords ?

 

Lord Ivor Richard

Well that’s the question on everyone’s mind at present!

I can tell you what I would like to see replace the existing chamber but I can’t tell you what the Royal Commission will recommend nor what Parliament and the government might suggest after their report has been published.

My opinion is that the House of Lords should be two-thirds directly elected and one-third nominated.  As the House of Lords is a political chamber, not just a forum for exchanging views, and because politics cannot be avoided when it comes to legislating and passing laws, politics is bound to enter into the composition and this can at least be regulated if it is channelled through elections. 

 

In my opinion the political element of the House of Lords should be directly elected by proportional representation based on a party list system. To be really heretical, I also think that members should be elected on fixed terms of 4 years, so that the second chamber is made entirely different to the first.  That said, MPs would obviously throw-up their hands at this proposal as it seems to suggest removing power from the House of Commons. In reality however, this solution actually proposes removing power from the executive, more than from the House of Commons. As such, it offers a solution to the single most important constitutional problem in the UK at present whereby the House of Commons cannot control the executive and up until now the House of Lords has not been able to. The programme of constitutional reform in the UK offers an opportunity to devise a legislative structure in which the executive is held to account more in the future than they have been in the past and this opportunity should be seized.

C’est en observant le fonctionnement des institutions anglaises que le Français Montesquieu avait élaboré une sage théorie des contre-pouvoirs sociologiques.

N’est-il pas curieux que ce soit précisément en Grande-Bretagne et en France, où le gouvernement et la chambre basse ne font déjà plus qu’un, que l’on cherche encore à éliminer le seul (léger) contre-pouvoir qui existe ? N’est-ce pas la traduction d’une certaine “tentation totalitaire” ?

 

 

 

Lord Ivor Richard

Well it is certainly true that all governments like to control, that’s the essence of being in government isn’t it!

While I don’t think there is anything particularly wrong with governments wanting to control and put their policies into action, there is a danger that Prime Ministers might chose to use this potential to pack a wholly nominated second chamber with their own political allies. This would obviously help ensure that government policies were put into practice, but it would also produce a totally unrepresentative chamber. Coming from the left-wing of British politics, this is actually a scenario which is quite difficult for people like me to grasp as the Labour party has always been in a position of permanent minority in the House of Lords. Until two weeks ago, the Labour party sat on one side of the House of Lords looking at 450 Conservative members who represented a permanent majority. It was unthinkable that the Labour party would ever be in a similar position and this only serves to reinforce the idea that an “unrepresentative,” totalitarian tendency has been exercised in the House of Lords for over a century.

In order to over-come this consequence of the nomination process, in its evidence to the Royal Commission the government proposed that an independent appointments commission should be set up with the power to vet nominations.

 

Patrice Gélard

De temps en temps je pense que c’est bien d’attaquer les contre-pouvoirs puisque ça les empêche de dormir.  Je ne suis pas mécontent qu’au Sénat il y ait une agression assez vive.

 

Alors que pendant un certain temps les Français ont attaqué le Sénat pour tout et pour rien, à l’heure actuelle, l’on s’aperçoit qu’il y avait une évolution dans la presse et plus précisément la grande presse comme Le Figaro, Le Monde et Libération où l’ont constate une attitude beaucoup plus positive à l’égard du Sénat qu’il y a quelques mois.  Je vois que ces attaques étaient une bonne chose parce que le Sénat a réagi relativement intelligemment. Or, c’est quand on est attaqué qu’on démontre vraiment qu’on est indispensable. 

 

Lorsque le Général de Gaulle avait voulu réformer le Sénat, on a vu comment il a su se mobiliser.  Je crois que nous sommes en train de faire une démonstration pareille au Sénat ces derniers temps qui est tout à fait utile. Nous nous montrons bien en tant qu’un contre-pouvoir nécessaire à la démocratie. En fin de compte nous sommes en train de faire passer ce message dans l’opinion publique. D’ailleurs, le sondage d’opinion engagé par le Président Poncelet est une illustration en soi de cette rénovation et de changement. Le président a fait ce sondage d’opinion pour voir comment était ressenti le Sénat par l’opinion publique, et ce sondage a montré l’attachement du corps électoral et des Français à cette institution.

 

Didier Maus

Le Sénat est un contre-pouvoir quand il n’aime pas la majorité de l’Assemblée nationale.

 

Patrice Gélard

Oui, mais le Sénat est aussi un contre-pouvoir quand il y a la même majorité car on a l’habitude de faire le travail de correction des mauvaises copies.

La réforme de la composition de la Chambre des Lords s’accompagne-t-elle d’un accroissement de ses pouvoirs ?

 

Lord Ivor Richard

I think the first question is very interesting, as there is nothing much wrong with the existing powers of the House of Lords. The problem however is that up until now the House of Lords hasn’t actually had the confidence to use these powers.  As a result, I would say that if “increasing powers” means “making more use of existing powers” then it is very likely that this will be one of the consequences of the reform process.  On the other hand, if “increasing powers” refers to increasing the scope of powers on paper, then no, I don't think that the reform process either could or should produce this result.  Moreover, I would go as far as to say that there is actually a case for reducing the powers of the House of Lords as they currently stand and ensuring that they were put into use more often. For example, I believe that if the reform process were to reduce the Lords’ power to delay legislation from twelve months to six months, then the power would not only be used more often, but it would be healthier for the legislative system in the longer term. 

 

The proposal that the House of Commons should be elected on the basis of proportional representation got nowhere. 

A commission was set up under Roy Jenkins to investigate the proposal and while their conclusions were favourable, the government has subsequently shown no enthusiasm for the recommendations. Indeed, if there was to be any governmental support at all for a move to proportional representation, the question would have to be put to referendum and it strikes me as being very difficult to fight a referendum on the intricacies of different PR systems.  In any case, as the proposal isn't getting anywhere at the moment, I don't think much will be done about the issue, certainly not before the next election.
In the long term will it be possible to maintain an unwritten constitution in the UK?

Will it be possible to reform something as important as the upper house without thinking of codifying the reform and protecting it with a constitutional court which might also be able to contribute to the protection of fundamental human rights and avoid recourse to European jurisdictions?

 

Lord Ivor Richard

I have thought quite a lot about the final part of this question and as I’ve already explained, my proposal is for a two-thirds elected one-third nominated chamber. The one-third nominated or non-elected members would be the cross-benchers, who are independent, non-politically attached individuals to whom I referred earlier. I believe that these people ought to have a place in our legislative system as it is vital to have Field Marshalls who can add their perspectives when talking about defense, or the contributions of Nobel Prize winners when talking about science. The nominating process which is used to appoint these members of the second chamber, will almost certainly have to involve the Prime Minister at some stage, however, as I explained, the government has proposed that nominations should be considered by an independent appointments commission before they are approved by the Prime Minister.  This solution would allow anyone to make nominations while also safeguarding against the Prime-Ministerial temptation to make political appointments to this third of the House of Lords. I also believe it could help secure independence of nominated members by freeing them from all interaction or sponsorship by the machinery of political parties.

 

On the first idea, all I can say is that I hope the UK will not be forced to have a written constitution!

As a lawyer, I can see that a written constitution would have definite advantages, there being nothing more conducive to the production of work for my profession in the United States than arguing over whether the constitution prevails over individual states’ rights.  On the other hand, as a politician, I don’t believe that a written constitution could be at all coherent with the British parliamentary system. This said, we have nevertheless begun to incorporate certain elements of European legislation into our legal systems in the UK.  Together with the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights, this is beginning to produce an outline of certain constitutional rights in the UK, which marks a substantial change. It will certainly be very interesting to watch the evolution of the interfaces between the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Irish Assembly and Westminster, but as yet, I’m not sure that anyone is very clear how this will happen or what the outcomes might be. Detailed statutes were drawn up to establish the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly but they did not tackle the intricacies of how these institutions could connect or work with central government. These questions will have to be worked out pragmatically, but I am optimistic that this is possible because of the UK’s un-written constitution, which allows for pragmatic evolution of this kind.

 

Meg Russell

To a certain extent I think we can observe a move towards a written constitution in the UK, albeit that this is not in one, single document, because, quite simply, an increasing proportion of constitutional legislation is being written down. The Scotland Act has set out the powers of the Scottish Parliament vis-à-vis Westminster just as The Wales Act has set out the powers of the new Welsh Assembly.  As Ivor Richard mentioned, the UK now also has a Human Rights Act and if and when a second stage of reform is implemented, the new House of Lords Act will set down the powers of the House of Lords. This evidence suggests that the new constitutional rules are being codified with increasing regularity, and that they are being written down.

 

In relation to the House of Lords, I think that the interesting question is actually whether the second chamber ought to have a specific status which makes constitutional statutes more difficult to change than other laws. At present, the UK is the only western democracy where it is as straightforward to amend the constitution, as it is to change any other piece of legislation. Consequently, when constitutional changes are proposed in the UK, there is no requirement to hold a referendum, no obligation to consult with regions or provinces as there are in some federal states and perhaps most significantly no additional powers for the upper house to protect the constitutional status-quo. As a result, I would argue that when we are considering how to reform the House of Lords serious attention ought to be given to the issue of introducing a power to protect the constitution. Far from providing a solution, without a codified constitutional document, this is likely to produce serious problems, underlining the need to define the nature and remit of the constitutional rules that require protection. Despite this, I would suggest that this need not be an insurmountable problem as a number of practical solutions can be found within the existing British system.

 

Since 1911 when the powers of the House of Lords were first reduced,  the Speaker of the House of Commons has categorised all legislation dealing with financial matters, under the title: “Money Bills.” The House of Lords is only able to delay legislation classified as a “Money Bill” for a maximum period of three months compared to twelve months for ordinary legislation. Although a little messy, this example demonstrates the way in which it might be possible to endow constitutional legislation with a different and more privileged status in the statute book. It also gives some idea of the existing mechanisms in the UK that could be used to identify and protect constitutional legislation. 

 

When making its recommendations, the Royal Commission on Lords Reform has been asked to pay particular attention to the constitutional changes established by the Human Rights Act, devolution and the changing relations with Europe. I would suggest that these examples indicate the relative health of the British system and even go as far as to say that the UK can be seen as being healthier in this respect, than a number of other countries with wholly nominated second chambers.

The Canadian senate provides a case in point when we consider that the Prime Minister and the members of his or her political party appoint all members of the Canadian upper house. Although the British Prime Minister nominates members of the House of Lords, this is not the case in the UK, where convention rules that the Prime Minister also nominates individuals from outside of his or her political party on the recommendation of opposition parties and independent individuals.

 

Like Ivor Richard, I would argue that these independent members of the House of Lords are very valuable.  Moreover, I believe there is a strong case for retaining the nomination system as it stands given that it would seem difficult, if not altogether impossible to find an electoral system which is capable of to selecting independent individuals of the same calibre as the present house.

If a nomination system were therefore retained, I would argue that it would only highlight the need for a parallel development of an independent appointments commission.  By assuring the presence of independent members of the second chamber, this type of body might also be able to encourage both political newcomers and party grandees to run for election to remaining seats in the House of Lords. As a result of such composition, in turn, the new commission could help discourage the tendency in the reformed upper house for one party to have overall control and thus provide a solution to one of the most fundamental problems of the House of Lords.

 

In the weeks which have followed the removal of the hereditary peers, the independent, cross-benchers have held the balance of power for the first time in the history of the House of Lords. It is a very interesting situation which presents us with an excellent opportunity over the coming months to consider whether this is actually a desirable composition which could be a possible model for the reformed House of Lords.

 

Lord Ivor Richard

Even though elements of federalism are beginning to emerge in the British system, I'm not in favour of a federal structure for the UK. Perhaps in fifty years time people will be able to say that the German second chamber is a good representation of the Länder and that we ought to adopt a similar model in the UK, but at the moment it is a little unrealistic. I would be very disappointed if greater European integration resulted in representatives of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly being sent to sit in Westminster. I think the introduction of a directly elected proportion of the reformed House of Lords would be a far more effective constitutional glue, capable of pulling together the constitutional structure without indirect elections of this kind, which strike me as quite useless in the British system.

 

My first objection to indirectly elected representatives is that they question the whole idea of representation. If, for example, someone were sent to Westminster from the Scottish Parliament, it is highly probable that the particular individual would represent the Scottish Parliament instead of  acting as a UK legislator. Another scenario might be that the Scottish Parliament could recruit individuals to become members of the UK parliament. In my opinion this would present an even worse prospect since the selection process would be completely un-accountable and the mandates poorly defined. I am not in favour of indirect elections because I believe they are actually disguised forms of unchecked nomination. I do, however, believe that there is some sense in the argument that continued devolution of power from central to regional government might in time lead to the introduction of some sort of federal structure representing the regions within the central UK parliament.  Again, this is not yet a reality at the present time.

 

Meg Russell

As part of my study of second chambers across the world, I visited Spain where a large-scale process of devolution has been underway for the last twenty years and I disagree with Ivor Richard on these points.  

When considering the changing constitutional structures of the UK, I think that in many ways we should look to other European examples such as Spain for some sort of indication on the direction in which the UK is heading. 

 

In retrospect, I think one of the more serious mistakes which was made in Spain’s remarkable transition to democracy, was not to have linked their upper house more closely to the devolution process. As a result Spain is now experiencing a significant degree of state fragmentation and realising that there is great potential for the upper house to help tie the national parliament into the framework of the sub-national legislatures.

Spanish regional assemblies elect a proportion of the Spanish upper house, and to date there is no obligation upon these members to form any kind of formal interface with the regional assembly. Members of the upper house are not, for example, either called to account by the regional assembly or invited to question sessions. Since there is consequently little or no accountability to the region, members of the upper house have become principally representatives of their political parties. I would argue, if we were to follow a similar model in the UK, that the membership of the House of Lords would not necessarily evolve in the same way. Ivor Richard has already mentioned the German model as a potential blueprint for a “regionally focussed” upper house in the UK. One of the reasons why the German system works so well is that members of the upper house who are also members of regional parliaments, regularly report back to their state parliaments to answer questions and participate in debates. This form of regional interface with the second chamber also ensures that genuine issues of regional concern are brought into the national debate.

 

No one yet knows how the UK system will evolve but I think that if there is concern about growing pressure for regional independence, then there is a case for arguing that the UK parliament should include some sort of interface with regional assemblies, whereby members who are capable of bringing distinctively regional issues to the national agenda also report back to regional assemblies. The pace of constitutional reform in the UK has encouraged many people to think, like Ivor Richard, that before the different strands of reform can be tied together there should be time for things to settle and find their own direction. The Spanish example shows that this is not necessarily the best solution. Rapid, widespread constitutional change in Spain has devolved power from the centre out to the regions in much the same way as in Wales and Scotland in the UK. However, lack of forethought regarding the mechanisms that might construct an interface between central and regional governments has led to calls for more extensive constitutional reform, including reform of the upper house and even greater pressure from areas like the Basque country for regional independence.  

 

Lord Ivor Richard

As you know the Law Lords are senior judges nominated by the Lord Chancellor from the Court of Appeal who are given a peerage in order to participate as a member of the senior court which sits in the House of Lords. The tradition of their presence in the House of Lords dates back to Victorian times when Law Lords were appointed as the very first Life Peers, appointed for life and unable to pass on their titles to their heirs.

 

It is very difficult to provide sensible justification for the presence of  these senior judges in the legislature and the presence of Law Lords in the House of Lords can be seen as yet another anomaly of the British parliamentary system since all constitutional and academic arguments would advise against a system where judges are legislating as well as judging. Personally, I can’t see any justification for the continued presence of the Law Lords in a reformed House of Lords. Given that the Law Lords effectively act as a Supreme Court, I think they would conduct their legal responsibilities in exactly the same way irrespective of their presence in the House of Lords or another building. The Pinochet judgement, which I know caused considerable interest here in France, is a case in point, as I am convinced that their presence in the House of Lords was of absolutely no significance in influencing the decision they made.

I don’t believe that the prospect of reforming the House of Lords actually questions the status of the Law Lords as judges. Instead, I would suggest that the more pertinent question is the prospect of a House of Lords without the Law Lords, as it my belief that the upper house would suffer if the Law Lords were removed. As Law Lords continue to sit as members of the House of Lords after they have retired, it could be possible for a reformed House of Lords to guarantee the invaluable contributions they bring to debates, by nominating retired Law Lords to sit as cross-benchers. Once again, the likelihood of this would depend upon the recommendations that are made for the form and structure of membership in the reformed upper house.

 

 

Patrice Gélard

En France en 1958, une situation comparable aurait pu être adoptée. Le Conseil Constitutionnel aurait pu faire partie intégrante du Sénat et les membres du Conseil Constitutionnel auraient pu être des sénateurs mais en statuant à part dès qu’il s’agissait du contrôle de constitutionnalité. Cette situation aurait été intéressante pour les Français parce qu’on aurait eu une cohabitation permanente, qui parfois nous manque un peu (c’est une boutade). A ma connaissance en tant qu’ancien président de l’Association internationale des constitutionnalistes, il n’y a qu’un autre pays du monde, le Singapour, où un certain nombre de membres d’une assemblée parlementaire exercent une fonction judiciaire suprême.

 

Questioner

I think that as a Supreme Court the House of Lords has a much broader role than the Conseil Constitutionnel in France because it is both a Constitutional Court and Supreme Court.

 

Meg Russell

People in the UK are only just beginning to think about the idea of the House of Lords also having the legal function of a Constitutional Court, in the light of some very interesting questions which have arisen since the introduction of devolved government for Scotland and Wales. In the future, it is possible that disputes between different regions of the UK or between a region and the national parliament could be resolved by members of the House of Lords or the Law Lords, who might also act as a constitutional court. However, before these proposals can be seriously considered as part of the Lords reform programme, thought must be given to the potential conflicts of interest between the roles of a member of parliament and a member of the judiciary.

 

Lord Richard

I think it is important to explain that there is a convention in the House of Lords where the twelve active Law Lords do not vote on normal legislation. They do not vote and they will not vote on these matters. Once they retire, the leash is off and they vote as they choose, in the same way as ordinary members of the House of Lords.

Lord Richard has explained that the Jenkins report on electoral reform was followed by “nothing”. Will the Royal Commission report on House of Lords reform also be followed by “nothing”?

 

 

Lord Richard

I think timing is an important factor to remember when we consider the future of the reform programme since unlike other countries, the UK does not have fixed term legislative elections.

The Royal Commission report will be published in the coming weeks and time will then be allowed for everyone to digest the report and agree on their responses. The report's recommendations will then be scrutinised by a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament and even though I am certain of the outcome at the joint committee stage, I fear it is impossible to say quite how long this will take.  Whatever the time-scale, it would be highly unlikely for the government to propose another House of Lords bill in the year before a general election.

Despite this, I think that the government will probably make a decision on their position on Lords reform before the next general election. If they then go on to win a second term of office, I would expect the introduction of legislation on the House of Lords in the next Parliament, which suggests a total time-scale of between three to four years.

 

Meg Russell

One thing that may be worth bearing in mind in relation to this question is the preamble to the Parliament Act of 1911, which included a commitment to remove hereditary peers from the upper chamber.  Despite a series of “reform-minded” Labour governments who were confronted with hostile majorities in the House of Lords, it has actually taken 88 years for this original reform to be implemented. When we recall that this reform was promised in the 1940s, 1960s and 1970s before finally coming to fruition in the 1990s, it would appear that we might require a significant level of public and political motivation in order to make any move to the next stage of Lords reform. It is very important to bear in mind that there is a considerable risk, that the British public might, at some point, get sick and tired of constitutional reform and want to get on with what they consider to be real politics.

 

 

 

Lord Ivor Richard

The franchise will be returned to the hereditary peers who leave the House of Lords once they no longer have the right to vote in the chamber. Remaining members, like myself, will continue not to have a vote in parliamentary elections.

 

There were four main arguments to retain the hereditary peers and none of these were actually very good!

The first argued that there was nothing wrong with the existing House of Lords, so why change it? The second focused on the lack of concrete plans for the second stage of reform, and argued that the first stage should not be attempted before clear plans had been set out for a replacement upper house. Other critics based their arguments on the independence of the hereditary peers acting as the backbone of the British Constitution arguing that the constitution would be irretrievable if they were removed.  I actually made a speech in the House of Lords on this subject during the course of our debates on Lords reform and said: “hereditary peers sit independently, listen independently, weigh the arguments independently and then independently vote conservative.”

Lastly, a number of individual hereditary peers argued on the basis of the service that their families had given to the country over the centuries and how sad it was to break that continuity. Personally, none of these arguments appealed to me, as I believed the only sensible argument was to remove hereditary peerages in the UK.  The individuals concerned will still be able to keep their titles and pass them on to their children but they will no longer have the right to legislate on the basis of their name.

 

Meg Russell

Another argument in favour of the hereditary peers was that in many ways they represented a random selection of what some may have called ordinary people.  Critics of this argument were nevertheless quick to point out that the hereditary peers were in fact a random selection of upper class white men, who for most people were not a random selection capable of ever being representative of the ordinary population.

It has been suggested that there should be a truly random element of selecting members in the new reformed House of Lords, but I don’t think anyone is taking the proposal very seriously.

 

 

 

 

Lord Ivor Richard

No, they won’t get any kind of golden handshake.  There is quite a heated argument at present on whether the hereditary peers who are leaving the House of Lords should be allowed to come in and use the dining rooms. I think some provision will be made for them in this respect, but they will certainly not be allowed to use the car park!

Is there an argument, as Johnathan Freedland has recently suggested, for an American-type republic in the UK and what do you think we could learn from the American republican example?

 

Meg Russell

Johnathan Freedland is a British journalist who has recently written a book entitled “Bring Home the Revolution”, where he suggests that the UK should adopt an American-type constitution.

While we comment on all matters constitutional at the Constitution Unit, we do not consider the monarchy, as this is a highly contentious issue in the UK. It has been suggested that removing the hereditary peers from the House of Lords will bring an end to the hereditary monarchy, but I don’t think there are any serious indications that this will happen. The British people tend to be rather fond of their monarchy, which by and large does not interfere in political affairs. Similarly, there are certain elements of the American constitution and the American Republican model such as the right to bear arms, which I am fairly sure the British people wouldn’t want to become involved with and should not do.

 

 

 

Lord Ivor Richard

I don’t actually mind what we wear or what we are called. When I was a boy I wanted to be called a “ Senator” because it had all sorts of Roman connotations. Although I now don’t mind what I am called, it should be understood how difficult it is to change names in the UK as it often raises issues that people are prepared to die for!

In essence, a decision has to be taken as to whether we want a real functioning second chamber or something that’s the sort of ‘pet’ of the constitutional family. People dressing up colourfully when the Queen comes to visit is very good for the tourist trade but doesn’t necessarily have any modern function. While it is perfectly legitimate to have a celebratory side of a second chamber, it is not what I have in mind. I want a second chamber which is properly constituted, properly functioning with good, decent powers that it is prepared to exercise and in the end that is what this whole argument is all about.

 

Didier Maus

Pour conclure, je veux simplement observer une chose qui me frappe, ce sont les hésitations. En France et au Royaume-Uni on est dans un processus de réforme important. Il a commencé, mais on ne sait pas quand il se terminera et à quoi il aboutira.  Je crois que ce débat nous a fourni une merveilleuse illustration de ce qu’est le pragmatisme britannique.

A few years ago at seminar in Paris, one of Lord Richard’s colleagues in the House of Lords was asked to respond to the question: “What is your constitution?”  He said, “Our constitution is our history.”

The UK is building its constitution at the moment and its history still remains its constitution.

 

 

 

·        There has been much thought in the UK about the future shape of the House of Lords but has there been much consideration of parité which is proving central to debate in France on the reform of the Sénat ?

 

·        Dans l’avenir y aura-t-il une évolution du rôle juridictionnel de la Chambre des Lords?

 

·        How can we justify the existence of Second Chambers where there has never been changes in political power, like the built-in Conservative majority of the House of Lords and the long-term majority of the Right in the French Senate ?

 

·        A quelle autre institution de “sages” confiera-t-on la possibilité de bloquer les lois “non financières” pendant un an, les lois “financières” pendant un mois, et celle de rédiger des documents d’information et de réflexion issus des ‘select committees’ ?

 

·        Dans le débat actuel au Royaume-Uni, évoque-t-on la possibilité d’un système “mono-camériste” sans chambre haute ?

 

·        La partie judiciaire de la Chambre des Lords (Law Lords) deviendra-t-elle désormais une juridiction autonome (Cour Suprême du pays) ?

Les Law Lords auront-ils un rôle à jouer dans le cadre du “Human Rights Act”?

 

·        La chambre haute n’a-t-elle pas vocation à donner une vision organique de la représentation ? N’est-ce pas cette vision qui est visée à travers elle ?  Pourquoi ?

 

·        Le poids politique de la Chambre des Lords ayant été considérablement réduit depuis les Parliamentary Acts de 1911 et 1949, la réforme projetée par le gouvernement visant à démocratiser sa composition, a-t-elle pour objet de lui redonner un véritable pouvoir? Ne serait-il pas plus simple de conserver une chambre haute “folklorique” et impuissante?

 

·        Si le Sénat français respecte une représentation géographique au pro-rata des habitants, qu’en sera-t-il dans la nouvelle Chambre des Lords? Quels seraient les critères retenus pour prouver son rattachement à une région (lieu de résidence, lieu de naissance, etc) ?

 

·        Quel est l’impact de la dévolution (Ecosse et Irlande) et de l’Europe sur la souveraineté du parlement britannique ?

 

·        Qu’en est-il actuellement du débat autour de l’introduction d’une constitution écrite et soumise à des procédures de modification spécifiques en Grande-Bretagne ?  Une Chambre est évidemment d’autant plus “menacée” que son existence dépend du bon vouloir d’une autre chambre. Quelles options sont actuellement les plus discutées et les plus plausibles pour la nouvelle chambre haute ?

 

·        La chambre des Lords devrait-elle être démocratique ou responsable de ses actes? L’idée de se débarasser du principe d’hérédité n’est pas nouvelle, alors pourquoi maintenant ? La réforme récente de la chambre des Lords semble n’avoir éveillé que peu d’intérêt dans le pays, pourquoi cela ?

 

·         Les pairs héréditaires annoblis peuvent-ils prendre leur retraite de la chambre haute et retrouver leur titre (purement honorifique) quand ils seront las de leurs tâches de working peers ?

 

 

 

Sénateur Patrice Gélard was elected as Sénateur (RPR) for Seine-Maritime in 1995 and sits on the Commission des lois. He is a Conseiller géneral of Seine-Maritime and a Conseiller municipal for Le Havre. Honorary chair of the International Association of Constitutional Law, he has taught at the universities of Lille II, Rouen and Le Havre.

 

Didier Maus is the chair of the Association Française des Constitutionnalistes and has directed the Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel, since 1990. Amongst numerous political and academic functions, he has taught at the University of Paris I, the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and the Centre de Recherche du Droit Constitutionnel. Didier Maus has published widely on political institutions and parliamentary and constitutional law.

 

Lord Ivor Richard QC was elected to Parliament as MP for Barons Court in 1964.  He served as UK representative to the UN from 1974-1979 he was named as opposition spokesman on Broadcasting and Telecommunication by Harold Wilson and was deputy spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the Wilson Government until 1974. He served as Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords from 1992 until 1997 when he was named Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords by Tony Blair until the cabinet reshuffle last year. Lord Richard has co-written Unfinished Business, reforming the House of Lords with Damien Welfare (1999).

 

Meg Russell is senior research fellow at the Constitution Unit of University College London, an independent think tank carrying out research around the governments programme of constitutional reform. She published the findings of her research on seven comparative upper chambers around the world, examining mixtures of federally and unitary states, and their direct, indirect election and appointment of upper houses, as Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas (2000).

 

 

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The British Council is the United Kingdom’s international organisation for educational and cultural relations. Our purpose is to enhance the UK’s reputation  in the world as a valued partner. We do this by creating opportunity for people worldwide with programmes in education, English language teaching, the arts, science, governance and information through a network of 254 offices and teaching centres in 110 countries. In everything we do we value individuals, promote internationalism and demonstrate integrity.

 

…Our Work in Governance & Society

The British Council's work in governance and society is people centred and emphasises equality and social inclusion.  It is about the groups and structures of people who make up our societies in Britain and France and about the differences as much as the similarities between us. Our aim is to build partnerships and networks so that ideas can be shared and debate exchanged between people with living and working experience of the issues in civil society. We engage with diversity and respect difference. We promote the status of women, the protection of child rights and the inclusion of marginalised groups, supporting access to justice and the realisation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

 

Extraído do site do British Council, em http://www.britishcouncil.org/france/english/infoexch/forms/reformreport.doc